

SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

14 JAN 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence  
for National Intelligence Programs  
Evaluation

SUBJECT: SIC Evaluation of DIA

REFERENCE: DD/S&T Memorandum, Same Subject, dated  
10 December 1964

1. The formation of DIA in 1961 led to the usual confusion at the working level and a lapse in production of considerable duration while the Agency organized. The minor role given to S&T at first was gradually expanded until in 1964 the equivalent of a directorate for S&T was formed. In the SIC this meant at first little more than having an additional member, the Service members retaining their vote and contributing directly to the Committee as previously. As the SIC generally operates informally, with few "votes" being taken, the Service and DIA representatives still have equal status and make separate contributions to Committee activities.

2. DIA has attempted, but with only limited success, to speak the "unified military voice." From my standpoint as Chairman, this has not been satisfactory. DIA, in effect, has interposed itself as an additional echelon of management with little or no ability to refine the product of the Services. Contributions, for instance to the NIS program, still come from the Services, but through DIA. DIA not only adds nothing productive, but slows delivery and fails to eliminate duplication among the individual Services.

3. As an example of the effect of the DIA interpositioning, the recent problem of submarine performance figures for NIE 11-14-64 can be cited. DIA was responsible for providing the SIC with Service-approved, coordinated values. Those submitted by DIA, it eventually turned out,

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
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were lifted from the 1963 version of NIE 11-8 and were outdated. Navy, having later information, disagreed with DIA's submission and sent its own data to DIA and to SIC. A week later Navy submitted still another version, after coordinating with DIA, in which some of the figures were changed. Finally, I called an ad hoc meeting of the SIC to resolve the differences between DIA and Navy, at which time DIA went along with Navy as the agency primarily responsible for submarine intelligence. The SIC was thus placed in a particularly awkward position, not only in having to act as broker between DIA and Navy, but having also to keep peace with ONE, as varying figures were presented, sometimes within a span of only a few days, as the "agreed" views of the Services, DIA, and the SIC.

4. DIA's S&T groups, small and staffed with Service personnel, still tend often to reflect the views and prejudices of individuals or Services which these personnel brought with them to DIA. It appears that these units have quite a way to go to fulfill the stated aims of "organizing, directing, managing, and controlling DOD intelligence resources" within DIA, coordinating DOD intelligence functions of the Services, and "obtaining maximum economy and efficiency in allocation of management of DOD intelligence resources."

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